Introduction
Central bank credibility is an important topic in modern central banking. Central banks have been in existence since the seventeenth century. Central bank credibility has waxed and waned throughout this period. In the past two decades the credibility of central banks has been high, at least until the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] . An important contributor to the achievement of credibility has been the advent and adoption of inflation targeting by many countries.
In our earlier work Siklos 2014 and 2015) we defined central bank credibility as the difference between measured inflation and the central bank's objective derived from a model that assumes that the central bank uses either an interest rate or an exchange rate instrument.
Our research, reported in Bordo and Siklos (2014) , for a panel of advanced and emerging market countries from 1880 to the present using both empirics and historical narratives, shows that credibility has behaved much like a pendulum with credibility high under the classical gold standard before 1914, then credibility declined after 1914 and was not fully regained until the 1980s with the advent of the current fiat money regime with primacy for low inflation.
Regressions in Bordo and Siklos (2015) show that key determinants of credibility include the policy regime followed (especially the gold standard), central bank independence from the fiscal authorities and financial crises. Since the 1980s credibility has been enhanced by adhering to inflation targeting (IT) which is associated with better communication and transparency (Bordo and Siklos 2014) . These results provide additional support for the pendulum like swing in central bank credibility over time and across countries. Nevertheless, in large part for both historical and institutional reasons, the pendulum view of changes in central bank credibility does not appear to readily extend to the case of many emerging market economies.
During the crisis the Federal Reserve and other central banks (e.g., Bank of England, European
Central Bank) undertook extraordinary lender of last resort measures to prevent a repeat of the events of the early 1930s, when a series of banking panics in the US led to the Great Contraction which spread to the rest of the world through the fixed exchange rate gold standard. Many of the policies implemented in 2007 and 2008 moved central banks away from their traditional role of protecting deposit taking institutions and the payments mechanism . For example, facilities like the TAF (term auction facility) and TSLF (term securities lending facility) in the US and government bond purchases by the Bank of England (BOE) led central banks to protect virtually the entire financial system. The Bank of Japan has similarly engaged in a large number of interventions in the financial sector including the purchase of equities. In addition, the Fed, BOE, and others began following credit policy, picking winners and losers, which is usually viewed as a form of fiscal policy (Goodfriend 2012) . Also noteworthy is that many of the facilities developed during the crisis involved both the Fed and the Treasury. These actions may have compromised the Fed's credibility. This, in spite of the fact that both the Fed and the BOE have an understanding vis-à-vis their respective Treasuries indemnifying them from certain losses stemming from interventions in the financial system.
Once the zero lower bound was reached at the end of 2008 the Fed and other CBs adopted quantitative easing (QE), the purchases of long -term Treasury securities and mortgage backed securities. These were viewed as unconventional forms of monetary policy. In addition to the open market purchases of unconventional assets, the Fed (and the BOE, among other central banks) adopted forward guidance in an attempt to manage expectations. There is considerable debate over the effectiveness of QE. The current consensus view holds that it has had a significant but limited effect (Bernanke 2012) . There is also a debate over the effectiveness of forward guidance and there have been a number of well-known events when central banks have created confusion by changing their statements in unpredictable ways (e.g., the Taper tantrum in May 2013, the BOE backing away from thresholds for the unemployment soon after they were introduced). Indeed, the Bank of Canada Governor has recently argued that forward guidance should be used sparingly, preferably only in times of crisis (Poloz 2014) . The resort to these unconventional tools also begs the question whether central bank credibility has been affected.
In reaction to the crisis many central banks have also decided to elevate the objective of financial stability to the same level of importance as macro stability. This is based on arguments that the credit cycle leads to significant imbalances involving credit booms and asset price booms, which can burst leading to serious recessions. Some have argued that central banks should also use their monetary policy tools to prevent credit and asset booms from getting out of control. This strategy creates problems for the use of the central bank's policy rate in meeting multiple objectives. At the same time, many central banks have begun using macroprudential tools including capital ratios, leverage ratios, liquidity ratios, to name just a few examples, to head off credit and asset price booms. Finally, the question of the exit strategy to be used to restore normal monetary policy has crucial implications for central bank credibility.
Central banks with large balance sheets with long maturities are exposed to credit risk when short-term rates rise. Some argue in favor of central banks raising interest on excess reserves while keeping the balance sheet constant to avoid the problems of conventional tightening (Cochrane 2014) .
How the exit actually plays out may impinge on central bank credibility as has the fact that, for example, the Fed began to publicly discuss an exit strategy since 2009. Equally problematic is that since the major central banks have signaled a desire for a return to 'normality', that is, a return to reliance on an interest rate as the principal policy instrument, they have yet to clarify what role policy rate changes will play alongside macro-prudential tools. Indeed, we have seen some central banks backtracking on earlier policy rate increases or delaying planned rate rises triggered in part by inflating asset prices (viz., housing) because of the implications of raising interest rates when the real economy is weak (e.g., Swedish Riksbank, Reserve Bank of Australia). As a result, asset prices may be artificially inflated by the maintenance of ultra-low interest rates. This state of affairs makes it difficult to see how to square macro-prudential concerns with the maintenance of price stability. Needless to say, all of the above pressures pose serious challenges for monetary policy. Poloz (2014) , in reflecting on the challenges facing monetary policy makers today, suggests that financial stability and inflation risks are negatively related to each other. As a result, "…the remedy to the inflation front could worsen financial stability risks, …". However, to our knowledge, other than Siklos (2014) who examines a small group of countries, there is effectively no empirical support for this view.
In our previous papers, owing to the absence of market-based measures of inflationary expectations, our credibility indicator was derived from a reduced form expression based on a small structural model. In this paper we construct an unbalanced panel consisting of inflation expectations data for 86 countries available from Consensus Economics. The samples range from the late 1980s to the present for advanced economies and several emerging market economies while the data begin in the mid-2000s for the remaining set of emerging market economies examined. This allows us to construct a more direct indicator of credibility as well as permitting an examination of how the crisis of 2007-2008 affected central bank credibility.
Nevertheless, as mentioned previously all monetary policy regimes, including IT, face difficulties because of the expansion of central bank responsibilities in the maintenance of financial stability. Indeed, from an institutional perspective, one might argue that a conflict of interest exists between monetary policy's emphasis on interest rates to control inflation and maintain stable real economic outcomes and financial system stability which is threatened by a central bank unwilling to rely on its main monetary policy instrument when it is required because it is willing to risk being 'irresponsible' (Woodford 2012 ) about financial stability in order to deliver the necessary monetary policy stimulus.
Econometrically, the paper takes on board some of the warnings from Geraats (2014) , about panel estimates that mix IT and non-IT economies. She criticizes the methodology and questioned the results by Ball and Sheridan (2005) who argued that the inflation targeting (IT) policy strategy has little to offer in delivering a desirable inflation performance. Of course, neither Ball and Sheridan (2005) nor Geraats (2014) evince any concern about financial system stability as part of a central bank's policy strategy. We estimate an unbalanced panel consisting of 53 emerging market economies, 32 advanced economies, including 24 countries that have announced a formal inflation target. The raw data are monthly, quarterly, and annual. In the estimation phase we convert all series to the quarterly frequency. After estimating the evolution and empirical properties of credibility, as defined in Siklos (2014, 2014a) we estimate an ordered probit model, which asks: what are the factors, both economic and institutional, which statistically influence credibility. The factors are global and domestic in nature (e.g., domestic output developments, oil and commodity prices, changes in the stance of monetary policy), and institutional (e.g., whether the country targets inflation, the transparency of the central bank, the exchange rate regime in place, degree of capital mobility, general governance environment a central bank operates under).
To this we add proxies for financial stability. There is as yet no consensus on how to best measure financial stability risks. Consequently, we construct updated and improved measures of financial stability as discussed in Siklos (2014) . We extend these measures to the much larger data set that is examined in this study. For example, asset price gaps, defined as the mean of HP filtered housing prices and deviations from broken trends in the log level of housing prices for over 50 countries, represent one such indicator. Others include the first principal component of selected financial indicators from a World Bank dataset on the composition and state of the financial sector (e.g., percent of non-performing loans, domestic credit to GDP, risk premium on lending) for the 86 economies in the sample. The volatility of equity returns, in real exchange rates, as well conditional volatility of inflation forecast errors are other potential candidates for inclusion. Finally, of course, we can use principal components analysis to reduce the dimensionality of the disparate determinants of financial stability.
Section 2 discusses the data used. Section 3 discusses the empirical methodologies followed.
Section 4 presents the stylized facts and econometric results and section 5 presents our conclusions.
Data
Current year and one year-ahead CPI inflation and real GDP growth from Consensus economics for up to 85 economies are used in the empirical analysis below. The number of economies sampled falls to 61 when observed real GDP growth is used simultaneously in the analysis. 1 The availability of data for other potential covariates also has a significant impact on the number of cross-sections that can be examined at one time (see below). Finally, arguably the most important developments in central banking since the early 1990s was the adoption of inflation targeting, and the simultaneous rise in the importance of central bank
transparency. An annual index of central bank transparency since 1998, originally developed by Eichengreen (2007, 2014) , and updated by Siklos (2011 Siklos ( , 2016 , is used. 7 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the rise of central bank transparency parallels the adoption of inflation targets.
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Given the variety of sources, sampling frequencies, and compilation methods, the resulting panel of data is unbalanced. In addition, it seems most practical to estimate the econometric relationships of interest at the quarterly sampling frequency.
5 Voice and accountability is defined as "capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media." Rule of law represents "…perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence." Political stability captures "g perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politicallymotivated violence and terrorism." See Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastuzzi (2010. pg. 4) . 6 We also considered Heritage House's index of economic freedom or fiscal freedom (http://www.heritage.org/).
Economic freedom is based on a grouping of 10 quantitative and qualitative factors that include the rule of law, property rights, regulatory efficiency and trade openness. A more complete definition is available at http://www.heritage.org/index/about. Fiscal freedom is an aggregation of three indicators, namely the top marginal tax rate on individual income, the top marginal tax rate on corporate income, and the total tax burden as a percent of GDP. More details are available at http://www.heritage.org/index/fiscal-freedom. The conclusions discussed below were largely unaffected. Hence, their use is not discussed further. 7 Central bank transparency data are available from the Central Bank Communication Network http://www.central-bank-communication.net). The index aggregates 15 attributes which are then sub-divided into five broad categories. They are: political transparency, which measures how open the central bank is about its policy objectives; economic transparency, an indicator of the type of information used in the conduct of monetary policy; procedural transparency, which provides information about how monetary policy decisions are made; policy transparency, a measure of the content and how promptly decisions are made public by the central bank; and, finally, operational transparency, which summarizes how the central bank evaluates its own performance. 8 The rise in transparency is not, however, solely associated with the formal adoption of numerical targets since the U.S., Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the Swiss National Bank (SNB) are not, ordinarily, included among the group of inflation targeting economies even though they are considered to be central banks where inflation control is part of their remit.
As explained below our methodology considers, where feasible, the inclusion of 'gaps' for both inflation and real GDP. Essentially, two different strategies were adopted in the estimation.
First, we computed either a 2-year or a 5-year moving average of observed and forecasted inflation or real GDP growth. Alternatively, one-sided HP filters for the series were fitted.
Because real GDP and price level data were not available for a sufficiently long span of data much beyond the advanced economies the filters were applied to the rate of change data. This is somewhat non-standard. Hence, a very high smoothing parameter (100,000) was applied to ensure that sensible estimates of the gap are generated. Alternatively, in the case of real GDP,
we also used the change in real GDP growth. The latter can be likened to a 'speed limit'
indicator of monetary policy. 9 More generally, candidates selected as potential determinants of central bank credibility are expressed as a percent of GDP, in index form (e.g., adoption of inflation targeting, central bank transparency, governance), or in rate of change form (credit variables, real exchange rates, asset prices).
Methodologies
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we compute two separate estimates of credibility. As noted in the introduction most central banks have a responsibility to control inflation. For some accountability, at least in legislative terms, may be stricter than for others (e.g., in inflation targeting central banks versus others). Hence, it is natural to think of central bank credibility, broadly speaking, as a function of the differential between forecasted or observed inflation and some estimate of the inflation rate that the central bank targets. As central banks have become more forward-looking over time they have placed a premium on the outlook for inflation (and real economic activity more generally) rather than simply relying on past performance. Even when a numerical objective is available it is often expressed in the form of a range and there is usually sufficient flexibility in the mandate of the central bank to miss the target range, at least temporarily. Hence, the mid-point of a target range, often used as a proxy for the monetary authority's inflation objective, seems too stringent an assumption to make about the near term 9 Our conclusions were unaffected when we compare our gap estimates with ones, where available, generated from levels data. The one-sided filters were estimated twice holding either the first or last observation end-points fixed. In the case of estimates of the output gap we also examined the mean of the two one-sided estimates. The concern here is over the well-known end-point problem with traditional estimates that resort to an HP filter.
inflation objective of some central banks. Next, we must decide on the penalty a central bank suffers when the inflation objective is missed. A straightforward assumption, in common with the literature on central bank objective functions, is to assume that the loss of credibility rises non-linearly the further away observed inflation is from target. An operational definition that meets this criterion is provided below.
Estimates which assume that any departure from some estimate of the inflation objective represents a departure from perfect credibility are, by construction, unconditional. In other words, although departures from the central bank's inflation objective is a good proxy for its credibility such a measure is not informative about what are its driving forces. Hence, it is of considerable interest to investigate the extent to which economic, financial, or institutional factors that can explain variations in credibility over time.
Ideally, as in Bordo and Siklos (2015) , we would estimate the central bank's inflation objective based on a model where the central bank is aware that the neutral or equilibrium real interest rate can change over time, as well as the other variables that define the state of the economy as summarized by a monetary policy rule such as the oft-used Taylor rule. 10 Unfortunately, in a large cross-section data set of the kind used here such an approach is impractical because there are insufficient data of the kind we require to generate time-varying inflation objectives beyond a relatively small number of advanced economies. Instead, we assume that a central bank's inflation target is linked to variations in the Consensus forecast over the medium-term. 11 These are smoothed (see below) near-term forecasts that reflect the likelihood that a medium-term inflation objective will not vary as much as short-term inflation forecasts that are published at the monthly frequency. Moreover, the medium-term forecast in this manner can deviate, even persistently so, from some numerically announced target due to the flexible application of inflation targeting, where relevant.
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It is also conceivable, of course, that the central bank's inflation target is more backwardlooking. In this case the monetary authority's inflation objective is driven by past inflation performance. The backward-looking version is also smoothed in the manner described above for the Consensus forecasts based inflation objectives. 13 In any event, since the two proxies for a central bank's inflation objective range from being either purely forward-looking to being backward-looking, we are effectively providing a range of credibility estimates. Most (e.g., Woodford 2003) would argue that inflation expectations combine forward and backwardlooking elements.
The foregoing discussion suggests the following two definitions of central bank credibility. They are:
where 1 f t π + is the fixed horizon one year ahead (i.e., t+1) inflation forecast published in month t, and t π is the proxy for the time-varying inflation objective. Most, though not all, inflation control regimes specify a ± 1% range of indifference. 14 We implicitly assume that even if the central bank is not required to adhere to a numerically agreed inflation target it is, at least in principle, interested in adopting a similar range to maintain its credibility. Hence, it seems plausible to assume that a central bank's credibility is penalized relatively more heavily when the monthly forecast is outside the range than when it is inside the range. 15 Squaring the deviations is a natural definition that follows from the standard approach of assuming a quadratic form for losses in central bank objective functions. Clearly, other assumptions are the authors generated are based on annual, not monthly, data and over a much longer sample that the one examined below. 13 Since the calculations include contemporaneous inflation a small forward-looking element remains in the estimates of the monetary authority's inflation objective. There is usually a lag in the publication of current month or quarter inflation rates. 14 A look at the economies that adopted inflation targeting (see the Appendix A) finds that only South Africa and Thailand specify target ranges that are slightly larger than the ± 1% presumed in our calculations. 15 Our definition of credibility can also be modified so that no penalty is attached when inflation fluctuates inside the ±1% range. In any event, the conclusions reached below appear unchanged when this change is made.
possible. 16 Indeed, depending on the persistence properties of inflation forecasts inside the range the central bank's credibility may not be negatively impacted at all. However, persistent deviations within the range may result in a loss of credibility.
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Recall that t π is either forward-looking, as when it is based on one year ahead Consensus forecasts, or backward-looking, as when it is based on moving averages or H-P filtered observed inflation rates. We first proxy the time-varying inflation goal, t π , either with a two or five year moving average of inflation forecasts or a forecast derived by applying an HP filter to inflation forecasts in the manner also discussed above. In the absence of the required information to formally derive a central bank's own forecast we implicitly assume, at least over the medium- we next ask what determines credibility over time. Letting i refer to the regional groupings 16 The issue is discussed in greater detail in Bordo and Siklos (2015) . 17 The relevance of this point is highlighted in recent discussions, mainly in some advanced economies, that inflation rates are persistently below (or some years ago, persistently) some target range of inflation.
considered, we consider three potential sources of influence on credibility over time. Therefore, we supplement our estimates with quantile regressions also in a panel setting. 18 We also considered oil prices (i.e., rate of change in either the Texas or Brent crude oil prices) but this variable was usually statistically insignificant. Hence, it is not discussed further. 19 That is, we test whether the fixed effects are redundant or not. Owing to the limitations of the data a single lag of the right hand side variables serve as instruments. A panel version of the Stock-Yogo (2005) suggests that the adopted strategy is satisfactory. 
Stylized Facts and Econometric Results

(a) Stylized Facts
We begin with a general description of the data and some stylized facts. These are presented according to the region of type of policy regime in place. Differences in the samples shown reflect differences in data availability.
Examining the record of advanced IT economies and the Eurozone we observe that inflation forecasts tend to be more stable than movements in the realized inflation rates. In addition, periods when Consensus forecasts deviate from observed inflation can and do persist over long periods of time. Nevertheless, it is interesting that, during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, Consensus forecasts greatly underestimate observed inflation in both advanced IT economies as well as in the Eurozone. In contrast, between 2009 and early 2014, forecasts of inflation were overly pessimistic in IT economies while the exact opposite occurs in the Eurozone where median forecasts are persistently over-optimistic, at least until well into 2013. As we shall see below, these developments may partly be explained by observed economic growth performance. Turning to the other economies considered we find that for those economies, in the main referred to as emerging market economies, median inflation has fallen quite noticeably over time and the gap between observed and forecasts begins to resemble that seen in advanced economies. In contrast, economies that neither target inflation nor are part of any of the other country or regional groupings considered, experience not only more volatile inflation but median inflation rates do not appear to have fallen as far as they have elsewhere in the world. Figure 2 illustrates a potentially important feature of the data that not only influences our credibility indicators but also helps us better understand the relationship between inflation forecasts and observed inflation performance across countries and regions of the world. Figure   2a shows, for the group of advanced economies in the sample, the range of inflation rates and forecasts from the worst (i.e., highest inflation rates) to the best performers (i.e., lowest inflation rates). When inflation rates are relatively low that are not only relatively less volatile but considerably easier to forecast. Presumably, this kind of outcome ought to boost a central bank's credibility. Notice, however, that the worst performing economies in the advanced world generate not only highly variable inflation rates but forecasts are generally far too optimistic compared to outcomes. Presumably, this should imply a loss of central bank credibility over time. quite clearly large and persistent credibility losses during the second half of the 1990s. The situation is only reversed once the Swiss National Bank adopts inflation control measures and targets a forecast of inflation. The financial crisis, followed by the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, also leads to credibility losses. Credibility only improves when the SNB puts a ceiling on 21 We do not explore this possibility empirically as space limitations prevent us from exploring the issues in greater detail except in so far as the global financial crisis is a rough proxy for a common shock to central bank credibility (see, however, Table 2 ). .2) serves as the proxy. Nevertheless, some differences do emerge as is perhaps apparent from the discussion surrounding Figure 5 . We began by examining the time series properties of the CRED proxy. All tests, in a panel setting, soundly reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the data. 22 Hence, estimates of equation (1.3) and (1.4) are in the levels.
Readers are also reminded that the panels are unbalanced and there is the added challenge that the number of available cross-sections changes when we contrast pre and post crisis samples. 23 We experimented with several variants of equation (1.3) to determine how our conclusions would be affected but this need not always result in an improvement. For example, to ensure that the number of cross-sections in the sub-samples considered this meant dropping some variables that well prove to be statistically significant in a longer sample. Nevertheless, when all is said and done, we believe that the estimates presented, especially in Table 1 , are fairly representative of the results obtained across the large number of variants of equation (1.3) estimated. We return to this issue in the concluding section.
The results in Table 1 are sub-divided into two samples. The "pre-crisis" sample consists of available data until 2006Q4. The "crisis and post-crisis" samples begin in 2007Q1 and end in 2013Q4 or 2014Q1, again depending on data availability. 24 For simplicity, we refer to the second sub-sample as the "post-crisis" sample. All estimates rely on the quarterly sampling frequency. In Table 2 , in part to economize on space, estimates for the median, maximum and minimum credibility cases are estimates of equation ( [1997] [1998] . Again the main conclusions discussed below are unaffected though, not surprisingly, the size of some of the coefficients is affected by the resort to full sample estimation. An alternative we did not implement is to rely on idiosyncratic dating for the global financial crisis (e.g., see Hashimoto, Ito and Dominguez 2012) as opposed to assuming that the crisis (starting date: 2007Q1 and ending 2010Q4) duration is the same for every country in the sample. 24 We also generated estimates for the 2007Q1-2010Q4 sample but these paralleled the results for the crisis/postcrisis sample shown in Table 1. emerging market economies. Generally, increases in the VIX are seen in both samples as reducing central bank credibility. This is the case in the five country groupings shown which cover the vast majority of the planet. Only in the post-crisis phase in the Asia-Pacific and the otherwise unclassified economies (i.e., OTHER) is a rise in the VIZ associated with a rise in credibility. Since the VIX is based on the performance of the U.S. S&P 500 index this could reflect a spillover effect wherein higher volatility in U.S. options is seen as improving domestic credibility though the data are silent on the mechanism through which this takes place.
Evidence for the G7 suggests that financial stability related determinants are indeed important in both samples while the economic determinants considered (i.e., real exchange rates and real GDP growth) typically affect credibility post-crisis. A rise in economic growth post-crisis raises central bank credibility an indication perhaps that central banks in the G7 placed relatively greater weight on the real side of the economy relative to pre-crisis times. Elsewhere in the advanced world rising economic growth is also seen as improving central bank credibility often both before and after the appearance of the global financial crisis. Other than the VIX real economic outcomes post-crisis comes closest to being a common factor across the globe.
However, it should be noted that the coefficient on real GDP growth post-crisis is considerably and statistically significantly smaller in all regions examined other than for the G7.
In the G7, advanced economies post-crisis, and Asia-Pacific economies throughout the period considered, a real appreciation signals greater credibility likely because this is consistent with lower expected inflation. It is interesting to note that, pre-crisis, real exchange rate depreciations raise central bank credibility in the Asia-Pacific region. This is likely to be a reflection of the lingering effects of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998.
Returning to the financial stability-central bank credibility links we observe that housing prices and credit growth, impact the G7 and other advanced economies differently. 25 Rising housing prices improve credibility in the G7 pre-crisis but, in the advanced economies, which, of course, 25 There was insufficient data to estimate the impact of these variables include the G7, this result carries over into the post-crisis period as well. 26 Similarly, higher credit growth improves central bank credibility post-crisis. Turing to the Asia-Pacific economies, the only other grouping for which we had sufficient housing and credit growth data, the situation is reversed post-crisis. Higher growth rates in both variables reduce central bank credibility in the region. As was noted above, the impact of the global financial crisis was felt mainly the advanced economies. Unfortunately, we could only reliably estimate the impact of the spread for the G7 where this is seen as a financial variable that improves credibility. 27 Put differently, a rise in long-term rates relative to short rates, often a signal of higher future real growth, raises central bank credibility. In particular, it is also worth noting that the parameter estimate is over twice as large relative to the pre-crisis period (and the difference is statistically significant). Finally, where available, the data indicate that central bank credibility is positively related to stock market performance. Whether this is an indication of higher future economic growth and/or stable future inflation is unclear. We do know, however, that stock market returns and monetary policy are linked to each other in advanced economies (e.g., see Bohl,
Siklos, and Werner, and Bohl, Siklos and Sondermann).
As is clear from Table 1 we have far fewer of the covariates available for the full set of emerging market economies or other economies not otherwise classified. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that rising non-performing (bank) loans reduce credibility in the group of 'other' economies. Because we have insufficient data on central bank transparency for this group of economies voice and accountability acts as a substitute. Pre-crisis this is seen as improving credibility but the effect disappears post-crisis.
The most prominent institutional variable considered is the adoption of inflation targets and the concomitant rise in central bank transparency. 28 These are seen to improve credibility pre-26 Part of our findings might be due to the fact that we do not weight the economies by size or some other weighting scheme. Estimates using cross-section weights did not change the conclusions. 27 Too many cross-sections are lost even when we attempt to include the term spread in the panel of advanced economies. 28 As mentioned previously, the adoption of inflation targeting (and its duration) seems roughly inversely proportional to the rise in central bank transparency. Indeed, when we replace the inflation targeting dummy with the overall indicator of central bank transparency we obtain comparable results. We do not pursue the possibility crisis only in the G7, and throughout the entire sample in the Asia-Pacific. Elsewhere, that is, in the advanced economies as well in emerging market economies that adopted inflation targeting, greater central bank transparency is the vehicle through which credibility improvements take place although the effect is no longer statistically significant post-crisis in the emerging market group considered.
In Table 2 we turn to estimates at the median and tails of the distribution of credibility. in this fashion we are able to examine how the best, worst, and middle of the distribution of central banks respond to the available determinants of central bank credibility. To conserve space we report results for Advanced and Asia-Pacific economies. Combined these economies represent the overwhelming fraction of the world's GDP.
The results are striking for they highlight the disadvantages of focusing solely in the mean responses of central banks, as in Table 1 
Conclusions
This paper has generated credibility indicators for over 80 economies since the early 1990s. Our indicators are instructive for several reasons. First, they indicate that financial crises can lead to a credibility loss but not for all central banks. When central banks perform well in terms of credibility they respond to economic, financial and institutional determinants differently from the median or least credible central banks.
It is apparent that central banks do respond to asset prices and financial indicators more generally. Nevertheless, asset price inflation can boost credibility as well as reduce it. Increases in equity returns can raise credibility and the same result is found for housing prices. The picture is more mixed when assessing the response to credit growth. Nevertheless, when we examine the central banks that perform best on the credibility scale they either do not respond to asset prices, other than to the term spread, or can suffer credibility losses when asset prices inflate. The bottom line is that when it comes to the relationship between financial stability and central bank credibility the data suggest that caution is in order for those who would argue that monetary authorities should take on ever broader responsibilities for the financial performance of economies.
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To be sure the results so far can only be characterized as tentative. Beyond a fairly small group of advanced economies the range of candidate determinants of central bank credibility is thin.
Indeed, the challenges in constructing a comprehensive dataset, allowing us to answer the question about how central banks ought to respond to financial conditions, are substantial.
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